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Paris in Bogotá: Applying the Aid Effectiveness Agenda
in Colombia
Rosemary McGee and Irma García Heredia
Summary
Recent research in the field of development aid persuasively problematises aid
relationships and begins to reveal their significance for the real-life application
and effectiveness of international development cooperation. Until insights from
such research percolate through aid machineries such as the OECD DAC and
its workings, the country-level consequences of universal aid frameworks and
prescriptions will continue to be insufficiently foreseen, and in some cases
unexpectedly problematic.
This paper is about an in-depth, qualitative study of the application of the Paris
Declaration (PD) on Aid Effectiveness in Colombia. This middle-income, non-
aid-dependent country with a prolonged and complex internal armed conflict
and a poor human rights record, hitherto on the margins of international aid
circles, has fast assumed a high-profile role in them via its adoption of the PD.
The study stemmed from a conviction that PD application in Colombia has
unanticipated consequences, with under-appreciated impacts on the strategies
of donors and social actors. Donors are subject to an attempt to push them
(back) into a technocratic corner. In this politically complex context where
donors’ presence owes at least as much to concerns over Colombia’s
international human rights performance as to classic aid donor concerns with
widespread extreme poverty, this is worrying and undesirable.
It also has serious implications for the tripartite aid dialogue process
established in 2003, involving Government, donors and social actors. This, for
all its flaws and frustrations, is unique and important in a historic context of
polarised, antagonistic and violent relationships between the state and left-wing
advocates of human rights and social democratic principles.
It will require skilful and opportunistic responses by both donors and social
organisations to turn this conjuncture to their favour, in the sense of streng-
thening their leverage on the Government in relation to human rights, poverty,
conflict and democratic governance.
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1 Introduction
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness1 will prove to be only as good as its
application in the real world of aid relationships. Like all universalist
technocratic frameworks, it needs to be appraised in the light of political and
social realities of the diverse contexts where it is applied. Recent perspectives
on development aid (Groves and Hinton 2004; Eyben 2006; Wallace 2006)
emphasise the need to understand it in terms of power relationships played out
between politically motivated actors in political contexts, as distinct from the
technocratic focuses that have dominated aid debates. The important
implications of these understandings have yet to percolate through inter-
governmental aid bureaucracies like the OECD DAC, whose core business
involves generalising, standardising and promoting aid recipes like the PD
around the world. One corollary of this is that the country-level consequences
of universalist aid prescriptions are rarely fully appreciated in advance.
This paper stems from a conviction that the application of the PD in Colombia
constitutes a worrying case of unanticipated consequences. We argue that as a
consequence of Colombia’s adherence to the PD, aid donors are now subject
to an attempt to push them (back) into a technocratic corner, with a purely
technical role, a worrying and undesirable development in this politically
complex context marked by internal armed conflict and human rights abuses.
Our study2 applies an ‘aid relationships’ perspective to analyse the process of
applying the PD in Colombia. We are not disinterested academic researchers,
but each bring to this topic longstanding interest and experience in the aid,
policy and development scene in Colombia. Irma García coordinated DIAL, a
Bogotá-based advocacy network of international development NGOs, from
1999 to 2007, and Rosemary McGee was the Colombia Country
Representative of Christian Aid and an active member of the DIAL network,
from 2004–2006. In these capacities, we were each personally involved in the
establishment and unfolding of the London-Cartagena-Bogotá process,
discussed below, and broader aid relations with Government, international
official aid and diplomatic actors, and Colombian and international NGOs and
social movements, in the period leading up to Colombia’s adoption of the PD.
We promoted and supported efforts by donors to exert to the full their limited
leverage on the Government of Colombia (GoC) on human rights, internal
displacement and conflict issues. This background enables us to contextualise
our research findings against the complex web of relationships and processes
characterising the various spaces of the Colombian aid scene.
We were curious about the details of the adoption of the Paris Declaration in
Colombia, mindful that Colombia has only recently joined international aid
1 Hereafter PD.
2 The research on which this paper is based was supported by the Participation and Development
Relations programme of the Participation, Power and Social Change (PPSC) Team at the Institute of
Development Studies, University of Sussex, UK, using resources provided to the PPSC by Swiss
Development Cooperation and the Swedish International Development Agency.
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circles such as that which revolves around the PD, and has quickly and
purposefully assumed a prominent role in this circle, despite being a far from
typical aid recipient3 or ‘partner country’. We were frankly sceptical about the
Government’s motives in relation to the PD, and worried that donors might view
Colombia’s adherence simplistically, as a benign or positive development. Our
concerns are well captured by this citation from a document published by
ABColombia, an international advocacy project, shortly after we conducted our
fieldwork in February–March 2009:
According to the declaration, recipient countries should exercise strong and
effective leadership over their own development policies and strategies,
supported but not led by donors. In many developing countries this
emphasis is vital, but in the Colombian context, where internal armed
conflict and ongoing human rights violations are rife, directly funding
government agencies could reduce the room for manoeuvre and access to
resources for civil society organisations [and, we would add, official donor
agencies and diplomatic missions] that are working to hold the state to
account.
(ABColombia 2009: 26)
In particular, three fundamental PD principles appear to have possibly
undermining implications for official donors’ and civil society actors’ efforts to
exert policy leverage on conflict and human rights issues in the Colombian
context:
 government ownership of development strategies, and by extension aid
agendas, funds and processes
 donor alignment with partner governments’ strategies and country systems
 harmonisation of donor activities. Although the PD includes ‘principles for
delivering effective aid in fragile states’ (OECD DAC 2005: 7) which seek to
nuance the harmonisation prescription for ‘environments of weak
ownership and capacity’, these have limited applicability in Colombia,
which is not generally considered a fragile state and certainly not a context
of weak ownership.
We thus set out to investigate the details of the adoption and application of the
PD from a wide range of perspectives. We explored through our reading and
interviews:
 why the PD has been adopted so enthusiastically by GoC, and what role
the international community has played in this
3 There is no perfect, incontrovertible terminology for denominating those states that are net providers
of international aid and those that are net recipients of it. The terms ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ are
politically undesirable because they assign to each, under technocratic guise, certain over-simplified
positions in a power relationship; and technically undesirable because they are not watertight, in the
sense that some ‘recipients’, including Colombia, are also ‘donors’. But convenience demands that we
choose a terminology and use it consistently, and this one being common in PD literature and
language, it will suffice.
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 what the implications of its adoption are for donors, and for Colombian civil
society and international non-governmental organisation (INGOs)
advocates who engage with the GoC and donors on development, human
rights and conflict issues
 what can be learnt from the Colombian case that is useful for the wider,
real-world application of the PD.
We drew on a combination of primary and secondary sources. Secondary
sources consist of aid and development literature, both published and grey.
Primary sources are interviews conducted in Bogotá in February–March 2009
with 25 purposively selected key informants located in the Colombian
government, official donor agencies, Colombian and international NGOs, listed
at Annex 1. While the general approach and specific precepts underpinning our
research draw on secondary sources that refer to all, the majority or an
archetype of PD signatories, our empirical evidence is thus limited to Colombia,
preventing us from drawing any general conclusions about application in PD
signatory aid-recipient countries overall. Our aspiration is narrower but deeper:
to complement existing knowledge about ‘Paris in practice’ by exploring the
real-life application of the PD in one Latin American middle-income country
characterised by no aid dependency,4 high institutional capacity, a protracted
human rights crisis and armed internal conflict, and a relatively small and
recent official donor presence. Historically, donor presence responds more to
political concerns relating to conflict, human rights and drugs control than to
the classic aid focus on widespread and extreme poverty, and the donors tend
to cast themselves more as policy partners than as aid donors.
Brief explanations of certain terms and translations are needed. The Spanish
word generally used in Colombia to refer to aid is ‘cooperación’, and,
occasionally ‘ayuda’ (literally, help). The distinction between financial aid and
other forms of cooperative relationship lying within the realms of diplomacy and
international relations, is significant to this study. Much aid discourse now takes
for granted that aid relationships embrace more than financial transfers,
including some measure of involvement by donor or other Northern
governments and intergovernmental bodies in aid policy, political dialogue and
influencing through diplomatic channels, and possibly reflecting trade relations.
We translate ‘cooperación’ as ‘aid’, but submit that at the heart of the struggles
over aid which we recount is a struggle over meaning. The Government of
Colombia’s construction of aid and aid policy dialogue, circumscribes it to the
narrower sense of financial transfers. This is pitted against a conception of aid
held by a significant number of donors operating in Colombia, as a complex set
of relationships and interfaces, including but overrunning these financial
transfers, extending into a range of fields related to ‘development’ understood
at its broadest, in which progress made may bear no relation to financial
transfers from Northern to Southern country.
4 0.4 per cent of Gross National Income, in contrast with Afghanistan at 37.8 per cent, Liberia at
54.1 per cent, or nearer home, Bolivia at 6.5 per cent and Nicaragua at 15.4 per cent
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/table6_11.pdf, accessed
24 September 2009).
IDS WORKING PAPER 342
10
Translation difficulties also arise with ‘política/o’. The noun ‘política’ means
public policy or a specific policy. The adjective ‘política/o’ means political or
relating to politics. In relation to aid in Colombia, ‘diálogo politico’, referred to
constantly in our interviews, sometimes means aid policy dialogue and
sometimes means political dialogue. Here again is the struggle over meaning:
the Colombian Government welcomes the ‘international community’ and ‘civil
society’ into aid policy dialogue but seeks to restrict the former’s role and
exclude the latter from any dialogue over public policy or (what it defines as)
politics. We have tried to render it in English in ways faithful to the sense and
context in which it was said.
There are well-rehearsed reasons to avoid using certain collective nouns such
as ‘international community’ and ‘civil society’ to refer to key aid actor
groupings as if monolithic and homogenous in their natures, interests and
stances. Both terms are used widely in Colombia, with little critical
consideration of the pitfalls. We use ‘international community’ to translate
virtually every use of ‘comunidad internacional’ that arose in our interviews and
in the Colombian literature, because there is a recognisable grouping, called
the G24, formed by the majority of ‘international community’ members with
representation in Colombia. While of course not devoid of internal differences,
it does refer to itself as a community, seek to advance collective interests and
take joint stances in its relationship with the Colombian government. For the
myriad uses of ‘sociedad civil’ arising in our interviews and the Colombian
literature, we mainly avoid translating it as ‘civil society’. Alternative terms are
used that better reflect the diversity it harbours in Colombia and avoid directly
invoking either of the two principal normative strands of civil society thinking
dominant in the literature, Gramsci’s and de Tocqueville’s (Lewis 2002;
Edwards 2009), although, as will be clear by the end of this report, Colombian
‘civil society’ generally acts according to the Gramscian version, and certain
donors, and the Government when it admits any role for it, foist upon it a de
Tocquevillian version.
In Section 2 we review the current state of knowledge on real-life PD
application, broadly discuss motivations underpinning aid relationships, and
outline the aid environment in Colombia prior to adoption of the PD. Section 3
presents our findings, with particular reference to the contours that the PD
implementation process had taken on by the time of our fieldwork. Section 4
concludes by returning to the concerns and questions motivating our research.
2 Paris and Bogotá
2.1 The Paris Declaration and its application
The Paris Declaration was adopted by more than 100 aid-donor and -recipient
states at the High Level meeting of the Development Assistance Committee on
2 March 2005. It is an international agreement which commits donor and
recipient country signatories to increase their efforts in ‘harmonisation,
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alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and
indicators’ (www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554
_1_1_1_1,00.html). It addresses a range of limitations on aid effectiveness that
inhere in donor country practices and in recipient countries’ practices,
institutions and capacity (OECD DAC 2005/2008: 1).
A few well-informed observers have warned of the challenges posed to the PD
by country realities (Hyden 2008; Booth 2008; Eyben 2006, 2008). Some of
them, writing at the general level rather than with any specific country reality in
mind, specifically call attention to the way the PD renders invisible or fails to
factor in the power and politics that lie at the heart of aid relationships. Most,
defining ‘effectiveness’ and ‘aid effectiveness’ in less technocratic, more
open-ended and holistic ways than the PD itself, conclude that this will
compromise the effectiveness of the Paris agenda (Booth 2008; Eyben 2006,
2008; Armon 2006; Hyden 2008; Ferrero y de Loma Osorio 2009).
Others scrutinise and test all or some of the PD principles against real life in
the real world of aid relationships in specific regions and countries, teasing out
the necessary adjustments in interpretation and application of the PD that the
diverse contexts of the global South demand in practice (Foresti et al. 2006;
Wright-Revolledo 2007; Pineda and Schulz 2008; OPM/IDL 2008; Hyden 2008;
Hayman 2009; Schulz 2009; Wallace 2009). Hyden (2008) points out that
critical to the implementation of the PD is ‘understanding better the role that
power plays in the aid relationship’, adding that [t]hese are not new issues but
the context is new’ (p259). He unpacks issues of partnership, harmonisation
and understanding of cultural and political realities in Tanzania, to support his
argument that the trust and accountability necessary for attaining the national
ownership essential to the PD ‘will not occur unless [donors] better understand
that development co-operation is no longer just about policy but also about
politics’ (p259–60). Hayman (2009)’s in-depth analysis of aid relations behind
the PD in Rwanda reveals the complexity of building the sort of joint ownership
that is needed for aid to be optimally effective.
In this literature specific mentions of Colombia are very few, as are the sort of
in-depth detailed country studies that we report on. Wright-Revolledo (2007)
analyses DAC country reviews to derive lessons about how diverse state-
society relations in donor countries shape the way Paris principles are applied
to the relationships between these and their development partner countries.
Although discussing these dynamics primarily in donor countries, the paper
makes several points that are suggestive for the Colombia case: ‘Countries
differ in terms of state-civil society relations thus one model will not fit all.
[…M]ore attention to context would recognise the risks of alignment of civil
society with state priorities. Only in this way can the autonomy and distance
that civil society enjoys from government be preserved’ (p6).
Schulz (2009) finds that ‘[b]oth technical and political dimensions find specific
challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean’ (p2), connected to most LAC
countries’ middle-income status. Like us he notes the scarcity of analysis of the
viability of the Paris principles in the LAC context. While warning against
overstating the contrasts between low-income aid-dependent LAC countries
and middle-income non-aid-dependent ones, he notes that the sub-group of
IDS WORKING PAPER 342
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(middle-income) LAC aid-recipients to which Colombia belongs ‘seems to
articulate aid effectiveness from a position of greater national autonomy,
advocating that international cooperation should complement other resources
available for development. On this basis, [this sub-group has] traditionally kept
a more horizontal relation based on shared interests with the donor community’
(p3). Summarising the utility and adaptability of the Paris principles through the
distinctive lens of LAC countries in general, Schulz relates Colombia’s more
autonomous position vis-à-vis donors to its relatively recent entry into the aid
effectiveness debate in general, and the PD in particular (p3).
Arising from the recognition in the PD that ‘fragile and conflict-affected
situations pose particular challenges’ (pi), OPM/IDL (2008) unpacks these in
search of greater understanding of their implications for PD implementation, in
preparation for the High Level Forum in Accra in September 2008. In situations
where the PD’s underlying ‘assumptions about national government capacity,
objectives, effective control and legitimacy do not hold’, either the PD will not
fulfil its aid effectiveness promise, or donors’ international engagement through
aid provision must be coupled with a state-building agenda, to address and
remedy gaps in capacity, effectiveness and legitimacy (piii). However, these
principles hardly apply to MICs which combine well-developed public
administrations with protracted internal armed conflicts of a complex political
nature. Not sitting easily with ‘fragile and conflict-affected states’ as defined by
the current discourse, Colombia is largely beyond the purview of this report.
Awareness that complex and diverse country realities challenge the general
Paris principles increased with the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held
in Accra in September 2008. The OCED DAC (www.oecd.org/document/6/
0,3343,en_2649_3236398_18638150_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 25 March
2010) recognises that ‘[t]he commitments agreed in the Accra Agenda for
Action (AAA) need to be adapted to different country circumstances – including
middle-income countries, small states and countries in situations of fragility’.
Thus we can expect more in-depth and case-specific analysis and action to
ensue from these debates in future, and submit the present study as a
contribution to this.
2.2 What’s the appeal of Paris?
In considering why countries would want to sign up to the PD it is useful to
start with a few premises about aid. Although elementary, these are not
necessarily familiar to observers in countries like Colombia, where aid and its
discourse have occupied a marginal role hitherto in public policy and academic
circles. To these we add some more specific insights provided by Eyben et al.’s
(2004) analysis of arguments and mechanisms for aid to MICs.
Firstly, familiar from the large aid literature is the idea that donor countries give
aid and recipient countries receive it in response to considerations of both an
economic/financial/technical nature; and considerations of a political or
ideological nature (Eyben 2008; Robb 2004: 21; Sogge 2002; Degnbol-
Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003; Riddell 2007). The PD embodies the
donor community’s current central preoccupation with aid effectiveness.
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Commitment to it is correlated with access to the benefits of aid. A country
wishing to increase the volume of aid it receives (‘more aid’) or improve the
effectiveness or quality of the aid it receives (‘better aid’) may seek to achieve
this through adopting and implementing the Declaration, and in doing so can
be expected to be driven by a combination of these two sets of factors above.
Secondly, ‘[t]he role of aid has to be understood in the wider context of
international relations. The “realist” approach to international relations assumes
that each country pursues its own interest and that aid is a part of that pursuit’
(Eyben et al. 2004: 12). Thus, a country signing up, regardless of whether it
pursues more or better aid, is best understood as acting in its own interests
within the wider context of its ‘web’ of relationships (Eyben 2006: 2) with other
actors on the international stage. The increased or more effective aid that may
result from its adherence is but one among several possible perceived
beneficial consequences of this move. In the case of MICs (a category in which
a significant minority of PD signatory countries fall), there are reasons for
wanting and receiving aid that are ‘likely to be more complex [than in] LICs
because of a wider range of interests at play in both receiving and giving
countries’ (Eyben et al. 2004: 11).
Thirdly, the motivations driving actors’ behaviour with respect to their aid
relations or their international relations more widely will combine reasons
overtly expressed and acknowledged – by recipients and their donors alike –
with other reasons less readily expressed and acknowledged. Common among
the former are likely to be aid recipients’ desires to lever more aid out of
donors, to render existing aid flows more effective by clearing up unsystematic
and even chaotic aid administration, and to develop closer relationships with
key aid-giving countries. Among the latter might be the ‘international public
goods case’ – a desire by aid donors and recipients to get prominent national
problems (drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism) framed as international
problems requiring international solutions in the form of international public
goods such as reduced drug trafficking, reduced money laundering, reduced
international terrorism (Eyben et al. 2004: 15); or the aid-recipient’s desire to
increase donor governments’ confidence in its government and improve the
political standing of the government and country on the international stage.
These are not mutually exclusive: enhancing the recipient country’s image as a
good, accountable aid manager helps improve its international standing in a
range of circles, and not necessarily only aid-focused ones. About the less
overtly expressed motivations for countries’ behaviour as aid actors, their aid
partners and other actors – including interested researchers – can but
speculate and hypothesise, on the basis of informed analysis of the available
evidence.
As for why Paris might appeal to Colombia, a few broad prima facie
considerations are enlightening before we delve into our data. As revealed at a
seminar hosted by the Government of Colombia to examine the pros and cons
of signing up (see Acción Social 2007b), a surprising number of the non-aid-
dependent MICs in the region were already signed up (Peru, Mexico,
Argentina), as well as LICs (Guatemala and Honduras). Colombia could be
seen to just be joining the club. Conversely, the same event revealed how and
IDS WORKING PAPER 342
14
why several MICs considered the PD of little relevance, and gave secure
grounds for expecting non-adoption to have no calamitous consequences, as it
had not for Brazil or Chile.
Bula et al. (2007: 15–16) recall that in 1976 Colombia attempted to join the
OECD, an unusual move for a ‘third world’ nation at that time and therefore
disconcerting for OECD members, who responded by kicking the request into
the long grass and letting it quietly expire. This historical datum reveals on
Colombia’s part a self-perception that might help us understand behaviour in
respect of the PD; and its perception of such spaces as useful, as desirable
clubs to belong to.
Finally, newcomers to international aid circles might over-value the benefits of
involvement in OECD mechanisms and particularly in its working groups and
task forces, compared to the perceptions of countries with greater experience
in the aid game. Where newcomers consider it an honour to form part of such
circles and take on such responsibilities, old-timers might, rather, experience
fatigue and decline to compete for such roles, considering it a success to stay
out of them. One interviewee saw Colombia’s irruption on the PD scene as a
case of taking advantage of a vacuum, recalling that since Nicaragua and
Bolivia had adopted the PD under previous governments, their current
governments attached little importance to it and Northern governments were
therefore keen for another Latin American nation to join up.
2.3 The Colombian aid context
The context into which the Colombian government released its announcement
of adherence to the PD in November 2007 was made up of three distinct but
inter-related strands of activity and debate. Here we provide a broad-brush-
stroke sketch of the Colombian aid scenario up to and including the point of
adoption, following these three strands and drawing on secondary literature,
interviews and our own experience as actors in that scenario.
2.3.1 The London-Cartagena-Bogotá process
What we now know as the London-Cartagena-Bogotá (LCB) process was
initiated in 2003 by a group of donors led by the UK. They intended to improve
the strategic direction of aid to Colombia, bringing the GoC’s aid requests more
into line with the reality of armed internal conflict, a humanitarian crisis, severe
inequality and pockets of poverty. While Colombia does not depend on aid, it
does need the presence of aid actors. Rising to the donors’ challenge,
therefore, early in its tenure the government of right-wing President Álvaro
Uribe Vélez convened a donors’ roundtable in London in June 2003 (Bula et al.
2007: 17).
‘Civil society’ in Colombia includes many left-wing opponents of the ongoing
Uribe government who, given the country’s history of violent suppression of
left-wing political organising and the right-wing political elite’s intolerance
towards them, have lacked spaces and opportunities for legitimate political
IDS WORKING PAPER 342
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5 The Spanish rendition here is ‘Estado Social de Derecho’. The correct translation of ‘Estado de
Derecho’ is ‘Rule of Law’, but the Colombian Constitution specifically characterises Colombia as
‘Estado Social de Derecho’. An accurate if cumbersome rendition of ‘Estado Social de Derecho’ is
‘Social and democratic state, subject to the rule of law’ – thanks to James Lupton for this.
debate, dissent or influence on public policy. As social actors they have long
lobbied successive national governments on issues of human rights,
peace-building and alternative development strategies and worked with the
international community and international NGOs to address these via donors’
aid programmes. As aid actors with an intensely political analysis of Colombian
reality, they set out to convert the London Round Table into a space for political
and policy dialogue over the role of aid in Colombia. The declaration they
presented to Colombian and other governments in London states:
Colombia urgently needs the defence and strengthening of the rule of law,5
a political solution to the internal armed conflict and full respect for human
rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as imperatives for
securing peace and democracy. Consequently, international aid to
Colombia must be directed at supporting initiatives that lie within these
parameters and do not contravene human rights and IHL norms, nor
promote the dismantling of the rule of law or otherwise exacerbate our
terrible humanitarian crisis.
(La Alianza 2003, www.laalianza.org.co/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=44&catid=44&Itemid=67, accessed 13 April 2010)
The London meeting established a tripartite dialogue space between social
actors, the GoC and international community representatives, still ongoing. At
its key roundtable meetings in London (2003), Cartagena (2005) and Bogotá
(2007), donor actors have issued declarations, drawing on social actors’
perspective among others, that the GoC has approved (G24 2003, 2005,
2007). These constitute the foundations of an aid policy and set the agenda for
the LCB dialogue process.
Early in the LCB process the ‘international community’ organised itself into the
‘G24’, the group of 24 foreign governments and intergovernmental bodies that
initiated it. From its initial role of silent witness in the debates between the
Government of Colombia and civil society actors, this group responded to the
course of events by gradually assuming a role of greater dynamism and bolder
positioning on sensitive issues. While it had no decision-making power, it
began to send out signals on these issues which did find their way into the
establishment of priorities and policies by Government.
Social actors organised themselves into the ‘Alliance of Social and Like-Minded
Organisations for a peace- and democracy-focused aid strategy in Colombia’ or
‘Alliance’, best classified as a social movement. This later forged a lasting
strategic alliance with other social groupings including the Catholic Church and
business associations. The Alliance plus these other groupings represents ‘civil
society’ in the LCB.
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The LCB process consists of a relatively intensive but continuous tripartite
dialogue taking place in meetings of different scope, sizes and focuses since
2003, its three actor groups the G24, social actors variously arranged in and
around the Alliance, and Government in the form of Acción Social (Presidential
Agency for Social Action and International Aid), and the Aid Directorate of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The process’s milestones are the London (2003),
Cartagena (2005) and Bogotá (2007) inter-governmental Round Tables or
Conferences on Aid. Each of these has been preceded by an event convened
by civil society organisations in which high-level Government and international
community representatives have participated. In the words of the UN Resident
Coordinator, ‘It is far from common to see a triangulation of this kind – a
dialogue about peace, equitable development, human rights and democracy as
aid priorities’.6
2.3.2 ‘Putting our house in order’: the national aid system
In parallel to the LCB process, the GoC set about putting its own aid house in
order. Under the direction of Luis Alfonso Hoyos, Presidential Advisor on Social
Action, it created the National Aid System (SNCI, Sistema Nacional de
Cooperación Internacional) in 2004 and, within the President’s Office, the aid
management unit Acción Social, and formulated an aid strategy for 2003–6,
which it discussed with social actors in the presence of the G24. Later, the
GoC unilaterally formulated a further aid strategy for 2007–10, consulting other
LCB actors on a full draft. This significantly altered the direction and emphasis
with respect to the 2003–6 strategy, foregrounding the Millennium Development
Goals, the ‘war on drugs’ and environment, and drastically reducing the
emphasis on democratic governance, rule of law and human rights issues.
These changes surprised the G24 as much as social actors. The latter held
that the changes in emphasis undermined the London and Cartagena
Declaration commitments in respect of strengthening the rule of law and human
rights, constructing lasting peace and a sustainable development model
through social and economic reforms, and instead relegated these vital issues
to the margins of the new aid strategy. International NGO actors pointed out
that by effectively invisibilising the armed internal conflict and its causes and
consequences, the new strategy made it difficult for aid-givers to define
relevant aid programmes (DIAL 2007). The new strategy, which cast social
actors in a role of monitoring the implementation of aid programmes with the
support of international actors, came to be considered the Government’s
strategy.7 To get round the GoC’s refusal to make any significant changes to
the strategy, and its insistence that debating public policy was beyond the remit
of the LCB process, a new scenario of ‘political fora’ was created at social
actors’ instigation, which in practice soon got absorbed into the LCB agenda.
6 Authors’ notes from National Aid and Human Rights Conference, Cartagena, 2–3 February 2007.
7 See Acción Social (2007a).
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2.3.3 Going for Paris at a run: from the Bogotá Round Table to Accra
At the last International Round Table Conference on Aid, held in Bogotá in
December 2007, the GoC announced its adherence to the PD. This
development had its own trajectory, intertwined with the various strands of aid
policy debates narrated above. The GoC had begun to engage with global aid
coordination and effectiveness processes, starting with the Rome Declaration
on aid harmonisation and coordination in 2003 and the Monterrey Consensus
debates on development financing (Buchelli et al. 2007). The series of
instruments with related aims which it designed and put into practice between
2003–7, such as the National System for International Aid, the Aid Strategy
2002–06 and incorporation of the latter into the National Development Plan
2006–10 (Departamento de Planeación Nacional 2007) , were in part its
response to these international aid processes.
The GoC had initially questioned the appropriateness of subscribing to the PD,
on the grounds of its non-aid dependent MIC status, and from a sense that PD
priorities and premises held scant relevance for countries such as Colombia.
However, when donors – especially the European Union – began to
increasingly invoke the PD in dialogue with the Colombian authorities, the GoC
began to perceive it as an essential tool of the new aid architecture and to feel
it was increasingly untenable for Colombia to stay outside the fold. Throughout
2007 it therefore convened events and commissioned analysis to examine
minutely the pros and cons of adherence versus the alternative of continuing to
coordinate aid via alternative mechanisms, principally the LCB dialogue space
(Acción Social 2007b; Buchelli et al. 2007).
A report commissioned to this end (Buchelli with Gómez 2007) notes that
although aid coordination has so far been incipient and fragmented, notable
progress has been made in respect of ownership, ‘given the country’s status as
a MIC’ (Buchelli and Gómez 2007: 10). However, ‘the greatest problems are in
relation to alignment and in the relationships between Government and state
institutions and between Government and donors’ (ibid.). The document warns
against staying out of the PD on the basis that that would perpetuate ‘business
as usual’: a continued lack of clear Government leadership of international aid
in Colombia and the creation by donors of alternative spaces for aid
coordination (ibid.: 13). The report strongly recommends adhering to the PD for
two reasons: the utility of a formal coordination mechanism, and the
legitimation of the advances already made in relations with civil society and
donors, both of which, the author insists, lack full confidence in the existing
space, the LCB process (ibid.: 14).
The stress on the need for legitimation of progress already made within the
LCB process insinuates that the perceived lack of legitimacy of the LCB
process as an aid coordination space is due to its home-grown nature and the
lack of an underpinning global coordination framework; but also to its distinct
purpose, and distortions that have arisen in practice:
The London-Cartagena process has not received due credit [but] has been
utilised in the shadow of some of the aid coordination mechanisms
introduced recently. This has produced a perverse effect: scenarios
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intended for political purposes have been used to present technical
instruments, like the Aid Strategy, rather than to debate the political
orientation of aid-related strategies.
(Ibid.: 26)
Once Colombia had formally adopted the PD, the Government proceeded to
develop a strategy for active participation in the Third High-Level Forum to be
held in Accra in September 2008. It hosted the preparatory Regional
Consultation for Latin America and the Caribbean (Gobierno de Colombia
2008) and took part for the first time in the OECD Paris Declaration monitoring
survey (2008). The Acción Social back-to-office report after Accra described
the GoC’s ‘active participation’ and proudly listed the successes notched up
there: Colombia returned from Accra as a member of the Working Group on Aid
Effectiveness, the entity charged with the global implementation of the PD;
having represented Latin American and Caribbean countries in the drafting
process of the Accra Agenda for Action; and having co-presided with
Switzerland in the Ownership Round Table, one of nine roundtables held at the
High-Level Forum (Acción Social 2008a). It had also participated in the Round
Table on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, ‘bringing to that space the
achievements attained in the London-Cartagena-Bogotá process, which was
highlighted by the Round Table as a case of good practice’ (ibid.: 2).
Government representatives had made known Colombia’s interest in hosting
the next HLF, due to take place in 2011 (ibid.).
Through these roles played before and during Accra, the GoC used to the full
the influence it had accumulated throughout the preparatory process,
positioning on the agenda three areas it considered weak in the PD: the failure
to take into account other actors beyond governments, such as Parliaments,
local governments and civil society; the excessively North-South and LIC-
oriented framing of the Declaration and lack of any consideration of MICs’
particular characteristics; and the absence of any mention of South-South and
trilateral aid which Colombia considers a high priority. Despite its claim that it
was ‘thanks to Colombia’s participation in the drafting [of the Accra Agenda for
Action, AAA] in representation of the region’ that these issues appear, in fact
for some time international as well as Colombian social organisations’ debates
on the PD had demanded recognition of civil society organisations’ role as aid
actors (ALOP 2008; Fernández 2008). Likewise, South-South aid, under
various guises and names, has been a longstanding aspiration and practice
throughout Latin America and particularly in Chile and Brazil, and had been
much-debated in the preparatory Regional Consultation (Gobierno de Colombia
2008).
Post-Accra, the Government drew up an Implementation Plan based on the
AAA (Acción Social 2009), which set out steps for attaining the goals agreed
for 2010, further operationalising two firm convictions expressed to us by the
Director of Acción Social. Firstly, ‘Colombia must be an actor in aid debates in
future’ and secondly, ‘rather than us having to adjust to the Paris Declaration
principles, the Declaration needed to adjust to the political realities of countries
like Colombia’ (interview notes).
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3 Putting Paris into practice
in Bogotá
In our fieldwork, 16 months after adoption, we enquired into the effects that
adhesion was having on the prior aid and policy dialogue scenario and on
relations between the actors therein. By then, Colombia’s adhesion to the PD
had taken on certain contours. The GoC was carrying forward the PD process
in parallel with the LCB process, the same government actors often cropping
up in both sets of spaces. The LCB process had become a fairly sprawling,
wide-reaching one in terms of both number and types of spaces it comprises
and range and kind of actors involved. In contrast, the PD process was being
carried out essentially in bilateral meetings between bilateral official aid agency
representatives or aid technical staff based in Embassies, and government
representatives from Acción Social and the Directorate of International Aid in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Acción Social and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
continued working hard to get the special characteristics of MICs and the
particular aid modalities of S-S and trilateral aid better reflected in the PD
process as it unfolds (Maruri 2009). Helped by the reputation it had rapidly
gained for sustaining a lasting and intensive tripartite aid and policy dialogue
process that included civil society actors, it continued playing a protagonist role
in the Aid Effectiveness Working Group and of the Advisory Group on Civil
Society and Aid Effectiveness. We present our findings here with particular
reference to these contours.
3.1 Same principles, new framework
The Colombian government had already made progress independently in
respect of some principles core to the PD, largely in spaces of the LC process.
What are the effects of it formally committing itself and its donors to further
progress on these, and within a new framework distinct from the LC process?
In the eyes of GoC respondents and also some Embassy and donor agency
respondents, joining the club of aid-recipient countries has definitely generated
benefits. These consist of closer relationships with certain donors, in some
cases reflected in closer resemblance of donors’ aid programmes to
Colombia’s public policy and budget priorities; more aid or more favourable aid
packaging; and enhanced esteem for good aid management.
Colombia’s relationship with certain key donors has got closer (notably Spain,
which is second largest bilateral donor after the US – Acción Social 2008b) and
considerably more aligned, both thematically and in terms of aid distribution
across geographical and administrative regions. Sectoral budget support and
basket funding mechanisms have been introduced by a handful of donors,
some close to the Uribe administration and others sceptical about
Government’s possible controlling motives but forced towards budget support
by their institutional policies. However, these moves are timid, lack broad
endorsement from the rest of the G24, and tend to be focused on either the
least controversial sectors such as environment, or the State’s organs of
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control such as the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office which, while not the
Government’s preferred target for aid and drastically under-funded by the
State, are nonetheless important accessories to a democratic image.
Statements made in the course of preparing for Accra show that the GoC has
made good use of the PD as a formal framework and lever with which to
reinvigorate its demand for alignment of donor policies and resources behind
its own vision of development and corresponding policy and budgetary
framework. This vision entails a military solution to deep-rooted social and
political conflicts, and correspondingly disproportionate military spending and
under-funding of social sectors. From 2001–7 Colombia devoted 4.7 per cent of
its GDP to defence, well above the 1.6 per cent average for the Americas and
also well above the 2.9 per cent average in 2005 for 27 countries in conflict
around the world (PODEC 2008: 9; Portafolio 2008). Defence spending for
2008 was equivalent to the total of health, education and environmental health
put together and defence investments accounted for 65 per cent of total
national government investments (PODEC 2008: 9). The GoC states rather
more appealingly the case for national ownership and donor alignment around
its development plans and budget:
In the interests of articulating aid flows with national aid priorities, defined
through a process of consensus involving the international community,
regional government and representatives of civil society in the framework
of the International Aid Strategy 2007–2010, donors need to orient their aid
more and more in keeping with the government sector.
(Acción Social 2008c: 1)
[The principle of] ownership, in a middle-income country with low aid
dependence like Colombia, represents an especially good opportunity to
complement our own development planning and dynamism with the
contributions forthcoming from international aid.
(Acción Social 2008b: 2 – emphasis mine)
To Acción Social’s satisfaction, EC humanitarian aid has been transferred to it
for disbursement. This EC move has angered and distanced key humanitarian
actors in the ONGI and Colombian NGO spheres. They refuse to accept funds
disbursed by Government and much less by a programme of the Presidency of
the Republic, even if originating from the EC, as this would compromise their
autonomy from Government and their neutrality in the eyes of armed actors in
some regions where they work. One government respondent offered evidence
that alignment has become more palatable to donors as a result of public policy
shifting in fields of high importance to them, in particular, in relation to the
treatment of victims of human rights violations. Rather than a reflection on
benefits from PD adoption, this is effectively an admission of the role played by
the LCB process, where the relevant dialogue has taken place between
government and human rights organisations defending victims, often
acrimoniously, with donors acting as referees.
Acción Social attributes a putative rise – or at least sustained level – of aid
flows to Colombia’s adoption of the PD, all the more so given its lowering
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expectations of aid increases to MICs. The putative rise in aid8 and its
connection to PD adoption was however refuted by an official donor, and the
short intervals between adoption in November 2007, the OECD survey
(February–March 2008) and our fieldwork (February 2009) tend to support his
position. The PD is being used by senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs actors and
also the Inter-American Development Bank to support the framing of aid to
Colombia as an international public good, which may help sustain current
levels or increase aid in the future.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims further progress in enhancing aid
effectiveness since the adoption of the PD, associating this with its
membership of the club. The PD framework is said to universalise and
formalise the Government’s practice of drawing up Memoranda of
Understanding with individual donors, and, uniquely, to provide indicators that
enable Colombia to demonstrate the progress it was already making in terms
of ownership and alignment (PNUD 2007). Government aid officials have
enthusiastically scaled the steep learning curve posed by participation in
high-profile international events such as the HLF in Accra.
The mechanisms for monitoring PD progress have permitted the GoC to at last
gather information on inflows of official aid that has proved elusive despite its
repeated efforts since 2004. This elusiveness to date is explained differently by
different actor groups: Government blames donors’ reluctance to provide it
transparently, whereas most donors claim it is impossible to adjust their data to
the data categories that the GoC sought to use. However, several donors do
suspect that repeated requests for detailed data on volumes, destinations,
partner organisations and end-beneficiaries mask political or ‘security’-related
considerations that could compromise the safety of partners and programmes,
and hence acknowledge their reluctance to provide them. While Government
actors treat data on aid flows as grist to the Government’s aid effectiveness
mill, donor actors see them as grist to the Government’s control mill. As proof
of the latter, one donor agency reminded us that when the government aid
coordination office (the precursor to Acción Social) began its attempts to
systematise aid in 2004 it wanted to introduce government approval of every
single official and INGO aid project. Since the INGO aid flows which
Government repeatedly berates INGOs for withholding are in fact mostly
publicly available, it is unsurprising that some donor and NGO actors view this
as a political issue, patently about control, ‘sovereignty’ and authority, rather
than a technical issue of information availability.
But the degree to which Colombian priorities are reflected in donors’ aid
programmes is clearly disappointing the Government. It formally complained to
one donor in 2008 for drawing up its aid strategy through its normal
consultation process and in so doing, treating the Government as just one
among several actors to be consulted. The 2008 OECD PD monitoring survey
8 Acción Social (2008a) claims that ODA to Colombia has risen by 90 per cent in 2004–6. Even allowing
for a large inflow in the form of the non-military component of the US’s aid package Plan Colombia,
this figure seems likely to reflect increased reporting rather than purely increased aid.
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took place too soon after adoption to capture progress since adoption, but
reveals a very weak base for the indicators of percentage of aid channelled
through central government (one-third, of which only 60 per cent is on-budget)
and percentage relying on national auditing systems only (1.5 per cent) (Acción
Social 2008b). Acción Social laments the lack of signals from donors that they
will act fast to improve these. Donors are not at all rushing to channel their aid
through Acción Social or national auditing systems. Some (Spain, UNDP)
appear to be deliberately counteracting the Government’s centralising tendency
by promoting decentralised aid to regional and Departmental (i.e. provincial)
government at the same time as participating in highly centralised basket
funding mechanisms. Others expressed major reservations about national
systems, in particular the lack of parliamentary oversight of the budget of
Acción Social, which is a Presidential programme rather than a state or
government organ; and serious accountability flaws in the Congress which
undermine this organ’s budgetary oversight role.
A final point here relates an observation made by the Director of Acción Social.
She called it a ‘paradox’ that ‘countries with weak institutions […] already have
a much higher percentage [of aid] channelled though government than
Colombia’ (interview notes). This may reflect a deliberate donor safety
mechanism rather than any paradox. All donor agency representatives
interviewed revealed explicitly or implicitly an interpretation of ownership that is
anathema to the GoC’s interpretation of the PD ownership principle, which they
seem to regard as overly literal. Their own view is that, PD or no PD, donor
agencies legitimately reserve the absolute right to determine the nature and
destination of their aid programmes. Most also made it plain that their agency
has no intention of shifting to channel its funds through Acción Social, or to
using exclusively national auditing systems, because it does not consider them
transparent enough and/or free enough from political (i.e. Presidential)
influence. They seem to see themselves as working in the spirit of the PD
rather than bound by its indicators. Thus, figuratively speaking, donors kept
their fingers crossed behind their backs while committing themselves to PD
principles in the case of Colombia. These facts, combined with Colombia’s
relatively good prior standing in respect of PD indicators, raise the question of
how far its adoption of the PD responded to donors’ need to count some MDG
and PD success stories among their aid recipients.
3.2 Two processes for the price of one
An argument advanced by Hoyos (Presidential Advisor for Social Action, to
whom Acción Social reports, and chief architect of the country’s new internal
aid architecture) in favour of adhering to the PD was the need for further
technical improvements. He distinguished this from the LCB process which he
referred to as ‘a convergence between Government and civil society’, thus
signalling that the two processes would fulfil distinct needs, both valid (Acción
Social 2007b: 2). Ironically, given longstanding Government and donor
complaints of too many meetings to cover, at the time of our research there
were two aid policy dialogue processes running in parallel, meeting and
overlapping at certain junctures, and involving virtually all the same institutions
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and many of the same people – although where their presence is large
enough, donor governments tend to be represented by diplomats in LCB
spaces and by aid technicians in PD spaces.
Throughout 2008 and 2009, the LCB process has had to adapt its
mechanisms, procedures and agenda in the light of the adoption of the PD, in
an effort to render these compatible with the dynamics of the PD process,
without at the same time denaturing itself as a space for policy and political
dialogue on aid priorities in a country in conflict. The 2009 LCB agenda shows
the results of social actors’ efforts to deal with this challenge by strategically
constructing points of convergence. It includes a critical appraisal of the MDGs
from an equity perspective, given the current economic crisis; and an analysis
of the aims and impacts to date of the 2007–10 Aid Strategy in view of the end
of the current Presidential term in August 2010.
Such has been the primacy of social actors in forging and keeping open these
spaces that the term most familiar in UN parlance for them, ‘civil society
participation’, does not apply at all. The LCB process, especially in latter years,
is a case of Government and the international community participating in a
project owned and propelled by civil society actors, who have had to negotiate
very hard and skilfully at particular junctures for its survival. But although they
have been the main force driving the process forward, social actors have not
so much pushed their own agenda as insisted on the need for the international
community to contribute to peace-building, respect for human rights and the
strengthening of the rule of law as the foundations of the aid programme
Colombia needs, as enshrined in the Declarations. The G24 has generally felt
its concerns fairly reflected by social actors, but its members are
simultaneously bound by the diplomatic imperative of responding to the
Government’s agenda, and held to account by the emphases of their own
governments’ aid strategies.
Even before the adoption of the PD, donors found this an equilibrium difficult to
maintain, as evinced by the frictions and intense debates generated when
Government unilaterally produced a new aid strategy for 2007–10. Viewed
through the prism of the ownership principle of the PD – which Colombia had
not yet adopted but about which it was already deliberating – such a
manoeuvre made more elusive still the donor actors’ equilibrium. The
ownership, alignment and harmonisation principles tend to narrow donors’
room for manoeuvre, as well as the space for political dialogue including social
actors. One G24 actor stated his predicament thus:
Acción Social always wants everything done through it. [My country] tries
to explain why it works as it does. It’s about applying the Paris principles in
a context of conflict and polarisation […] (emphasis spoken in original).
He added that his country’s line is to work with the State and the Government
and to keep open channels for aid policy dialogue, ‘[…] in other words, to
combine aid and diplomacy’ (ibid.).
The PD, then, was not introduced into a vacuum, but against the background of
the antecedents, accumulated baggage and experience of the LCB process.
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This remains alive and kicking, held up by donor representatives as a vital
political dialogue space that must be maintained and, some say, strengthened.
Government held it up in Accra as an exemplary case of coordination between
Government and civil society actors, as discussed further below. As for whether
Government aims to retain the political nature of aid dialogue and the
prominence of the LCB process, the Director of Acción Social says:
The political essence of London-Cartagena and the G24 must not be
forgotten. Aid was an excuse: the role of the international community in
Colombia is political. Paris is not about politics. As we move forward,
things will be done more technically. Politics will carry less weight.
While the Government’s moves to technically sort out aid in Colombia are
generally welcomed, many donors and social actors are sceptical as to the
Government’s motives in adopting the PD, and view the developments in aid
effectiveness since November 2007 as little different from what would have
happened without the PD. They infer that, notwithstanding possible motives
relating to control, ‘more aid’ and legitimacy, one covert but key Government
motive for PD adoption was to undermine or cut down to size a LC process
that had got out of (Government’s) hand.
Various evidence was cited in support of this view. First, when in an LCB space
social actors suggested that the LCB process could benefit from the application
of the Paris principle of democratic ownership in respect of debates on aid and
public policy, Presidential advisor Hoyos responded that that was dealt with in
the PD process. This was read as implying his desire to subsume important
elements of LCB within the PD process. Second, the high-profile announce-
ment of PD adoption was made at the third (Bogotá) International Round Table
of the LCB process despite the decision having been taken some time
previously, a move alleged by social actors to have deliberately stolen the
limelight from the key cast of the LCB in which social actors feature large.
Third, the LCB process is said to have significantly lost its political edge since
the PD came along, on top of the longer-standing shift in power dynamics in
the Government’s favour that has happened within it since 2003. This shift is
reflected in the fact that the Bogotá Declaration, although retaining some
important points from the previous two Declarations relating to human rights
and conflict, evinces strong and successful influencing efforts by Government,
and G24 representatives insist that its real strength lies not in its content but in
the fact that the Government could be persuaded, at this Third meeting, to
endorse it at all. We cite here the view of a Government actor, adding in
square brackets in roman social actors’ and critical donors’ interpretation of its
subtext:
Policy and political dialogue is always part of a State’s international
relations [The existence of the LCB policy dialogue doesn’t indicate
anything unusual or shameful about the aid and public policy context here].
The [PD] monitoring survey revealed that donors have a considerable
political role, but since the volume of their aid is small, this is not a given
[The extent and breadth of this role, exerted in the LCB process, we have
so far tolerated out of good will; but we now have an official aid framework
that they too have endorsed that enables us to re-orient aid dialogue away
from political issues].
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Although donors’ political analysis is considered by donor actors and social
actors to be lacking in some important ways, there is a perception among
donors that DP adoption, and the related positioning of the MDGs in the Aid
Strategy 2007–10, were tremendously skilful manoeuvres by the Uribe
government: ‘The limitation of the PD in the Colombian context is that it’s
framed for the MDGs, which in Colombia, most donors agree, should be
treated as minimums, not maximums, since Col was already close to achieving
several of them’. Government’s attempt to shift the international community’s
attention from uncomfortable issues like human rights to the MDGs is seen to
have had the unintended effect of prompting several high-profile and sceptical
donors to affirm this view about the MDGs and to come out and say clearly
why they are in Colombia. Less optimistic interviewees opined that since the
PD process started up, human rights issues are getting left in the LCB process
spaces, which have been downgraded as a consequence of PD adoption.
While Colombian social actors’ key task now is to ensure that they do not stay
there, most of them have such limited knowledge of the PD that its adoption,
and the tendency to ghettoise ‘their’ issues within the LCB process, will
automatically disadvantage them and dilute the overall focus on human rights
achieved to date.
The European NGO platform PODEC sums up its position on the introduction
of the PD in Colombia as follows:
In Colombia there is already a tripartite space which includes Government
and state, the international community (G24), and national and
international civil society organisations (the Cartagena Consensus, DIAL
and PODEC): the London-Cartagena- Bogotá Process. This is the ideal
policy space for adapting and taking forward the [most relevant]
recommendations of the Accra Agenda for Action.
(PODEC 2008: 13)
While in our interviews government and isolated donor voices interpreted the
PD process as enhancing and reinforcing the LCB process, many donors and
social actors involved in the LCB process agreed with PODEC. They insisted
on the need for the LCB process to continue and, wherever possible, to absorb
elements of the PD agenda rather than be absorbed by it.
All in all, it is hardly surprising that the PD appeared to be an opportunity to
‘restore’ the technical character to aid dialogue: aid as MDG-focused
international development aid, devoid of the language of human rights, conflict
and peace, and the domain principally of governments. To some extent this has
happened: some interviewees from all three sectors consider that LCB has lost
some of its dynamism and political edge. Decision-making within has become
concentrated on a few actors and participation has been reined in. Social
actors, especially those based in the regions, feel their advocacy opportunities
have been reduced to particular events in the LCB calendar which are so large
as to virtually preclude meaningful participation.
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3.3 The democratic credentials of ‘civil society participation’
In holding up LCB as a model, Government has wisely and accurately referred
to it as coordination between government and civil society actors, not as
‘participation’ of civil society actors in a government-inspired process, a framing
which would have accredited to Government more than its due. Even put thus,
the prior experience of a unique tripartite aid policy dialogue in the form of LCB
is winning plaudits and democratic legitimacy credentials for the Government,
in scenarios as high-level and visible as the Third High-Level Forum at Accra.
Social actors comment on the ironies of the Government profiling itself as a PD
signatory with something special to offer by dint of the LCB experience, while
at home it is the only LCB member who puts no enthusiasm into it. Chagrin is
understandable on the part of the social actors who have fought so hard
against the GoC to open and keep open at critical moments the dialogue
spaces and disposition that constitute the London-Cartagena process.
While some more technocratic donors such as the Inter-American Development
Bank stress the technical aid coordination merits of LCB to date, even they
acknowledge its value in keeping democratic governance, human rights and
international humanitarian law issues on the debating agenda, and enabling the
GoC to assume leadership among MICs on these issues. Government itself,
responding to the OECD 2008 PD progress monitoring survey, reports against
the principle ‘Mutual Accountability’ that ‘[i]n Colombia, the London-Cartagena-
Bogotá process has provided a forum for government to periodically inform its
aid partners and civil society about aid developments’ (Acción Social 2008b:
13). It is conscious, then, of the need to demonstrate its accountability
credentials and its democratic credentials, to this end casting the human rights
organisations that spearhead the LCB process as classic civil society
accountability-demanders that exert democratic checks and balances on the
state.
On a more constructive note, some Government actors have learnt through the
LCB process the value of the participation of social actors in debates on aid-
related themes, including human rights. While most of them prefer controlled
participation, some sincerely recognise the value of a much more autonomous
form of engagement by civil society actors.
Now the Accra High-Level Forum has deepened the ownership principle to
mean democratic ownership – embracing broader concepts of legitimacy than
simple government legitimacy – and has positioned social actors as legitimate
interlocutors on aid policy issues. In the light of these developments, civil
society and donor commentators who have observed with chagrin the political
and legitimacy capital that Government has made by – as they see it – touting
the LCB experience in international scenarios, foresee the Government
possibly getting hoist with its own petard, having to accept social actors as
legitimate interlocutors not only in the LCB process but also in more
technocratic and effectiveness-oriented policy dialogue about aid in Colombia.
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9 South-South cooperation is defined as ‘the practice of technical co-operation particularly led by
Middle-Income Countries as both providers and recipients of development assistance’
(www.oecd.org/document/51/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_43385523_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed
18 November 2009).
10 Triangular aid is defined as ‘development assistance from traditional donors executed by southern
donors (often in the form of technical co-operation)’ (OECD 2009: 141).
3.4 Distinctive characteristics: an aid-providing, middle-income,
southern signatory
Prior to Accra, Acción Social set itself the challenge of:
exerting an influence in the spaces provided by the DAC and the OECD to
get international instruments adapted, broadened and adjusted to reflect
the realities of MICs, and highlight their role and perspectives in the new
international aid architecture.
(Acción Social 2008c: 1)
These realities were debated centrally in a seminar convened by the
Colombian government in June 2007 to deliberate over adoption. Some of the
other Latin American MICs present – in particular Argentina – advocated
vociferous participation as a MIC, while others – Brazil, Chile – dismissed the
PD as irrelevant to them, as MIC donors rather than significant aid recipients
(Acción Social 2007b). This reflects a prevailing perception of the PD among
the participant countries as a lever for increasing aid, rather than as a
framework for donors and recipients to hold each other to account in achieving
more effective aid. The same interpretation is evident in Acción Social’s
assertion, referred to above, of the tendency for aid to MICs to decline unless
they signed the PD, and in the satisfaction it expresses at what it takes to be
PD-related increases in aid inflows.
The successes notched up by the GoC before and during the Accra High-Level
Forum amounted to a phenomenal act of positioning by a country which, ten
months earlier, had not signed up to the PD, and had never taken part in a
global-level DAC meeting before. In this, Colombia demonstrated its high
technical and institutional capacity and sheer sophistication in comparison to
many southern lower-income PD signatory countries.
Highlighted in most policy statements and official positions related to
Colombia’s PD adhesion and Accra preparations is Colombia’s status as a
provider of South-South aid9 and triangular aid,10 also mentioned by most of
our interviewees as a key aspect of Colombia’s positioning vis-à-vis the PD.
This self-framing as a country ‘in the process of transition to being
predominantly an aid provider’ (Acción Social 2007b: 1) has generated
considerable rhetoric from the GoC and the PD club overall, at Accra and in the
AAA, about the need for due recognition and future development of emerging
modalities of South-South and triangular aid. At the time of our research there
appeared to have been little concrete action to match this, except Colombia
chairing a Task Team on South-South Cooperation as an emerging aid
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modality, created at Accra largely in response to Colombia’s lobbying; and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Director of International Aid attending speaking
engagements abroad on the future of South-South aid (Maruri 2009).11
We gathered anecdotal evidence of a limited amount of South-South and
triangular aid provided by Colombia, and concrete evidence of one new South-
South aid programme provided by Colombia to the Caribbean Basin (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs n.d.), but could not ascertain the amounts or proportions
these modalities represent in relation to the national budget or aid inflows.
Neither was it clear to us whether there were any less visible benefits from the
provision of South-South or triangular aid (for example, relating to tax relief or
procurement concessions) which might help to explain Colombia’s enthusiastic
championing of them. The dearth of concrete information made us question
whether this framing might be largely aspirational and intentional, rather than
actual, at that point.
These two dimensions of Colombia’s positioning prior to and since PD
adoption, as both an aid-needy MIC and an aid-provider, are somewhat
puzzling because strategically speaking they seem to point in contradictory
directions. On the one hand, in policy statements and official positions and in
our interviews with government actors, emphasis is placed on Colombia’s and
other Latin American countries’ MIC status so as to highlight the substantial
and special aid needs to which this status gives rise, linking it to high levels of
socioeconomic inequality and geographically- or ethnically-defined pockets of
extreme poverty resistant to policy solutions. On the other hand, emphasis is
placed on Colombia as an actual or potential provider of South-South aid and
trilateral aid so as to illustrate the country’s considerable economic, institutional
and technical resources and justify a non-subordinate position in the
international aid scenarios which it is entering for the first time. The aid-needy
MIC framing emphasises factors that it is hoped will prompt PD-led donors to
sustain or increase aid to Colombia. The South-South and trilateral aid-provider
framing appears oblivious to the potential application of the PD to bind
Colombia itself as an aid provider, and treats it, rather, as an international
space that Colombia can use to show its credentials and project a favourable
image.
This apparent contradiction disappears if we think of Colombia desiring to
benefit from the advantages of aid receipt (because after all, providing
triangular aid is also aid receipt) while, in terms of aid power relations,
steadfastly avoiding the subordinate status assigned to typical aid recipients
and asserting itself in international scenarios as having a relatively high level of
institutional and technical development. For now, donors’ aid strategies appear
to be increasingly cognisant of Colombia’s MIC characteristics; but this may
reflect earlier DAC recognition of the peculiarities of aid-giving to MICs (see for
11 By the time of publication of this report there were more signs of action, among others the High-Level
Meeting on South-South Cooperation in Bogotá hosted by the GoC in March 2010.
(www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?conID=4554&catID=127 accessed 26 March
2010).
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example Eyben et al. 2004), and in any case is accompanied by increased
cognisance, too, of the armed internal conflict and complex human rights and
humanitarian emergency, a development less favourable to the Government’s
aims. However, there is no doubt that Colombia’s leadership on the MIC,
South-South and triangular cooperation issues before and at Accra have
gained it international profile and influence.
The adoption of the Paris Declaration in November 2007 opened up a fissure in
Colombia’s aid debate. On one side of the fissure is situated the existing
political and policy dialogue, which focuses on the aid priorities appropriate for
a country in conflict like Colombia, and in which social actors have played a
crucial role to date. On the other side is situated the debate on more technical
aspects of official aid, expressed in the principles of ownership, harmonisation
and alignment that characterise the PD, and in which the principal protagonists
are Governments.
3.5 Colombian agendas behind the Paris agenda
To the question of why the Colombian government signed up to the Paris
Declaration, three main GoC ‘agendas’ were pointed to by our interviewees: a
desire to control aid; a quest to increase aid flows; and a drive to boost the
government’s legitimacy on international, Latin American and domestic levels.
The fourth most prominent reason, cited only by GoC interviewees, is a desire
to hold Northern governments to account, using the mutuality of the PD to turn
the tables on them in terms of alignment and accountability; the fifth, a desire
to enhance aid effectiveness.
3.5.1 Control over aid in a context of armed conflict and conflict denial
Most aid-recipient governments are keen to control the aid they receive; this is
the origin of the alignment principle in the PD. Control over aid in the
Colombian case is not only about increasing aid volumes channelled through
the national budget, although many cite this as a motive also. Colombia is
mired in an internal armed conflict. The existence of the conflict was publicly
denied by the Government in 2005 in a communiqué to the G24, in an effort to
strip the armed insurgency of all political and social legitimacy, remove any
justification for the application of humanitarian principles to parties and victims
in the conflict, and focus the non-military aid efforts and policy dialogue of
donors on the social sectors. Uribe’s government is ‘trying to run a right-wing
agenda in a difficult neighbourhood’ as one donor put it, and ‘has made the war
on terror its signature tune’. As such, it needs to utilise every opportunity to
align donors’ policies and funds with its own politico-military strategy. Moreover,
by denying the armed conflict and stressing its war against drug trafficking in
its international relations, it risked losing the benefits of the principles of aid
relations unless it also framed itself as a worthy aid recipient with policies with
which donors could align their own. Unless donors heavily increased their aid
and human resources, in order to align with GoC policies they would have to
withdraw funding from the areas of humanitarian response, human rights
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defence and attention to victims of the conflict, with which Government is
uncomfortable, and home in on the MDGs and the much narrower conception
of development they embody.
Thus, the control of aid sought by the GoC is not a straightforward commitment
to greater alignment in the interests of greater aid effectiveness. It is a control
which aspires to align aid with public policy and budget priorities that have
proved controversial among the very aid donors; and one aspect of it is the
undermining or weakening of the LCB process as a key site of negotiation on
aid and public policy priorities.
In substantiation of this latter point, of the 18-paragraph London Declaration
(G24 2003) the GoC contrived and largely managed to focus donors’ attention
on just two of them, the ones about aid. This effectively ‘kept the international
community in its place’, their aid programmes being so small that orienting the
relationship towards aid afforded them little influence.
The ‘more aid’ motivation was cited by donor and government respondents
alike. In 2006 and 2007 the GoC received signals from certain donors
(Netherlands and IDB) that adoption would be looked on favourably because it
was in keeping with the directions of their own aid programmes and would lead
to more aid as well as more alignment. It perceived that its early attempts to
‘get its house in order’ by setting up Acción Social and the National Aid System
had been rewarded by increased flows, although the causal relationship
between these moves and increased flows is not clear and the increases are
anyway surely less in real terms than statistics gathered for the OECD PD
monitoring survey suggest.
3.5.2 A bid for legitimacy
The legitimacy case for signing the PD was foremost in many interviewees’
views. The GoC is seen as having acted to increase its legitimacy on the
international level, particularly with reference to the UN system and ‘clubs’ of
Northern governments; on the regional – Latin America and Caribbean – level;
and domestically in relation to the other two parties to the LCB process, civil
society actors and the diplomatic and donor corps. On the international stage,
the Uribe government’s reputation in the UN Human Rights Council was
parlous, thanks to the diligence of Colombian and international HRs
organisations in exposing government responsibility and complicity for
systematic and widespread human rights violations; it had recently gained the
status of the country with the second highest number of IDPs; depending on
definitions, it had arguably been in a state of war longer than any country in the
world yet had recently further complicated its international relations with other
governments by denying the existence of internal armed conflict or human-
itarian crisis. It had worked systematically to limit the power and reduce the
role of the United Nations agencies in and on Colombia.
Moreover, the Uribe government is seen as having inherited a severe
legitimacy deficit dating from the (1994–98) Samper government, when the
extent of penetration of state and government institutions by the drugs trade
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came to light. The subsequent Pastrana government (1998–2002) addressed
this problem by starting to make the ‘global public goods’ case for international
cooperation, especially in the field of counter-narcotics and peace negotiations
with the armed insurgency. The current Foreign Minister Jaime Bermúdez has
led a concerted drive to boost Colombia’s standing internationally, actively
seeking out scenarios that offer opportunities for this, including the PD, the
International Labour Organisation, and the UN Human Rights Council
(UNHRC), to which he offered Colombia as one of the first countries to
undergo the new Universal Peer Review mechanism.12 Colombia is even
considering requesting membership of the DAC soon. Having some track
record in the emergent fields of South-South aid and trilateral aid, it could
expect to command some respect in this donors’ club. An additional advantage
of positioning itself in the international aid scene is that Colombian social
actors, detrimental to the Uribe government’s reputation in the international fora
centred on the UN Human Rights Council, have no presence in or knowledge
of the international aid scene. That Acción Social officials summed up
Colombia’s performance at Accra by stating with satisfaction ‘We are clearly an
actor in the global aid architecture now’, seems to confirm that Colombia joined
the PD out of this aspiration.
Since the right-wing Uribe government assumed power Colombia has lost
friends and allies across a Latin America that was markedly taking a turn to the
left. This is due to Uribe’s closeness to the Bush administration and
involvement in the US’s ‘war on terror’ discourse and practice – with all that
meant for human rights violations and lack of respect for international borders
in its own internal counter-insurgency operations. But it also reflects the
contrast between Uribe’s style of government and those of left-wing leaders in
many other Latin American countries. Colombia’s reputation in the Organisation
of American States was suffering from numerous human rights-related legal
actions against the Colombian state brought to Inter-American Commission and
Court. The Inter-American Development Bank strongly supported Colombia’s
adoption of the PD partly as an opportunity to mend fences and assume
leadership at the Latin American level by joining, a proposition that has been
borne out by events since November 2007. Preparations for Colombia’s
participation in the Accra High-Level Forum which started as soon as the PD
was adopted, were approached by Acción Social officials as ‘an opportunity to
break onto the Latin American aid scene, where Colombia had never had a
presence’.
Domestically, since 2003 the GoC is considered to have lost legitimacy relative
to Colombian social actors as a result of the nature and dynamics of the LCB
process. Colombian social actors have proven adept at applying their political
skills to extract concessions in this political field; and the G24 has so far
resisted Government’s attempts to make LCB a process of aid policy dialogue
rather than political dialogue. Adopting the PD offered Government the chance
12 In the December 2008 UNHCR Colombia’s Universal Peer Review went badly for it: the reviewers’
report was not very critical but the discussion of it in the Council, led by Japan as the current
President of the G24, was highly critical and a strong declaration was issued.
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to tip the balance of dialogue back towards the technical terrain, where social
actors are less qualified and – at least until Accra put civil society onto the PD
map – their role could anyway be legitimately curtailed with respect to
Governments’ and donors’ roles. The fact that at the time of our fieldwork, six
months after the issuing of the Accra Agenda for Action with its call for a
central ‘civil society’ role in the PD process, there was still no tripartite space
for the PD process and instead social actors had demanded the LCB process
include some meetings on the subject, would seem to bear out this proposition.
3.5.3 Holding wayward donors to account
A motivation given by only GoC aid officials was that the mutuality embodied in
the PD offered the GoC a way to hold donor governments to account for the
first time. Acción Social officials reported that the unit planned to centrally
involve donors in a seminar it would host on Accountability in July 2009, to
challenge them on the way they tend to implement their own programmes in
Colombia instead of working through Colombian implementing agencies. For
Foreign Ministry officials the PD opens the prospect of ‘saying to donors, your
aid agency has committed itself to the Paris principles; why don’t you act in
accordance with them here?’. Given that at times government figures have
expressed anger at the way donors as well as social actors have called it to
account in various spaces of the LCB process particularly in relation to human
rights, there is every reason to assume that Government saw in the PD a way
to turn the tables on the donors, and in spaces of donors’ own creation.
3.5.4 More effective aid
And so we come to aid effectiveness, the fifth and almost least-cited reason for
Colombia to have adopted the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
According to one social actor, ‘Hoyos [the Presidential Advisor] adores order
and technocracy’. Beyond personal traits, USAID reported that Acción Social
was keen to implement USAID programmes itself rather than have them
implemented by expensive implementing agencies, USAID’s normal practice,
because that would enhance effectiveness as more aid would go to end-
beneficiaries. More broadly, the Government’s prior and ongoing measures to
organise aid and systematically assess its quantity, orientation and relation to
public policy, do suggest that the concern with making it more effective, foisted
upon the Uribe government in 2003 by donors in the form of an invitation to the
London Round Table, has become ‘owned’ by Colombia too. But that these
measures were largely put in place before Colombian government aid officials
had even heard of the DP, by their own admission, does suggest that a
concern with aid effectiveness was not the foremost reason for the Colombian
government’s adoption of the PD.
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4 Conclusions
We have provided a detailed picture of what is happening in aid circles in
Colombia, the historical background and existing aid relationships in which
actions relating to the Paris Declaration are being played out. We have done
so from the diverse perspectives of interviewees and authors situated in all
three actor groupings involved in the LCB process and/or the Paris Declaration
process. In this final section we bring the foregoing account to bear on the
questions and concerns that underpin this research.
Colombia signed up to the PD at a moment when it had recently succeeded in
imposing its own agenda over those of most donors in at least three significant
contentious matters: the revision of the aid strategy in 2006, the gradual
erosion of the image and influence of human rights-focused UN agencies in
Colombia, and denial of the existence of an armed internal conflict. Never, it
seemed, had the Uribe government less need to acquiesce to a donor agenda.
We posited above, after Eyben et al. (2004), that a country’s aid relations and
behaviour need to be understood in the wider context of international relations,
and that a realist approach to international relations assumes that each country
pursues its own interest, using aid among other mechanisms to that end. In
adopting the PD in November 2007, Colombia was pursuing its own interests in
two dimensions. As an actor on the international stage, for a range of reasons
core to the missions of most relevant multilateral and regional inter-
governmental organisations, the Uribe administration needed to make more
friends, on the continent or further afield. As a domestic actor the Government,
although elected and enjoying reportedly high ratings in opinion polls, had to
contend with an increasingly organised, highly capable and well-connected set
of civil society actors whom it perceived and treated as its political opponents,
and a diplomatic corps that openly questioned its commitment to democratic
principles, international human rights humanitarian law. The Government’s
actions need to be understood in the light of these pressing international,
regional and domestic interests.
As for the role of the international community in Colombia’s adoption of the
PD,13 our research indicates that many supported the idea only by default, as a
necessary consistency with their governments’ pro-PD positions. Diplomatic
missions and aid agency staff do not strongly believe that Colombia’s PD
membership will lead to significant improvements in national systems,
transparency, the elimination of corruption or other features of good
governance of aid. Where donors actively supported Colombia’s decision to
sign up, the range of reasons runs from strongly self-interested to altruistic. At
the strongly self-interested extreme, an explanatory factor lying beyond the
scope of our study may be that it suits donor governments to maintain or even
strengthen aid relations with a country in which it has strong or growing
13 It did cross our minds to ask ourselves whether donors could have refused Colombia entry: whether
there is any mechanism at the disposal of signatories, or of DAC members, for avoiding the entry of
particular aid recipients into a forum such as the Paris fold.
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commercial interests. If the PD is the direction in which aid relations are
moving, it does not hurt – and may well help – powerful trade partners who
provide a little aid, to welcome this trade partner into the mainstream of aid
relations.
Another cynical explanation, but aid- rather than trade-related, relates to the
current strong donor imperative to target aid towards poverty reduction and
demonstrate their impact in relation to it via mechanisms connected to OECD
and DAC processes, principally the MDGs. In most of the countries where they
operate, the PD is the ideal framework for pursuing these objectives. These
donor approaches may have been simply ‘read across’ into Colombia, with
varying degrees of concern and or awareness over contextual differences, in a
drive to meet donors’ own aid-related commitments.
More positively, many donors have a history of active concern about the kind of
aid demanded by successive Colombian governments. The aid demands reflect
politically-charged denialism about the country’s human rights situation and,
more lately, about the internal armed conflict and its manifold consequences.
The London Round Table was first moment of concerted donor action on this
concern, and has led to more formal aid-focused relationships with Colombia
over the period since 2003. The PD being the current aid framework that
Northern governments work within, its adoption appears logical and
consequential.
A few donor actors may have been acting according to their more-than-
averagely sophisticated political analysis. While more-than-averagely aware of
possible cynical motives on the GoC’s side, these donors are also well aware
of the GoC’s sensitivity over sovereignty and criticism and play their critical
cards carefully. They may have viewed the Government’s decision to join the
PD as, in the bigger picture, a fairly benign development. They might even
have envisaged the possibility that it would incidentally free up the LCB space
for valuable policy-influencing on issues relating to peace, conflict, the
reduction of the inequality that in their analysis lies at the roots of the internal
armed conflict. Or, depending on their confidence in the PD and AAA
mechanisms, they may hold out hope that Colombia’s entry will permit them to
exercise leverage for a reorientation of aid in ways more appropriate to a
context of armed conflict and inequality, not least through the current and
future development of proposed PD offshoots such as the DAC’s ‘Principles for
Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations’ (OECD 2007).
Returning to the citation from ABColombia with which we justified our interest
in this research topic, we end by summing up what our findings imply for
Colombian social actors, official aid donors and diplomatic missions party to aid
dialogues who work to hold the Colombian state to account over the causes
and consequences of the internal armed conflict and related human rights
situation.
We have argued that donors are now subject to an attempt to push them
(back) into a technocratic corner, with a purely technical role. Their political
leverage potential is at risk because the LCB spaces in which they can fuel it –
through gleaning grounded information and orientation from social actors – and
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exert it – through more or less frank dialogue with government aid, human
rights and conflict specialists – are at risk. On other hand, the risk to donor
leverage is limited, because their political influence has always outweighed
their aid volumes. Moreover, as long as their trade relationships remain stable,
the broad if limited influence these Northern governments enjoy by dint of their
commercial and defence relationships is probably safe.
Internationally, the legitimacy gains the GoC is making as result of PD
membership are considerable, and help to tip the power balance in the tripartite
relationship in favour of the GoC. This hampers the continuous efforts made by
some G24 representatives to sound international alarms about Colombia in
inter-governmental circles and with their own Foreign Ministries in relation to
peace, human rights, international humanitarian law and conflict. On other
hand, it is recognised in inter-governmental circles – for instance the UN
Human Rights Council of December 2008 (ABColombia 2010) that human
rights concerns are far from resolved.
Nationally, too, the GoC is making legitimacy gains which would tend to further
disadvantage both critical G24 members and social actors in spaces like LCB.
Social actors will need the support of these critical G24 members more than
ever to manage this. The more critical donor actors in Colombia seem poised
to hold out for LCB continuation and reinvigoration, and keep playing down the
PD in relation to LCB. They seem unlikely to be blinded to political realities or
beholden to the GoC by the prospect of an aid partner government scoring
highly in MDG or PD commitments. They have in their favour the fact that
fragile states and conflict issues are becoming more and more central to aid
agendas everywhere and therefore increasingly impossible to keep off-bounds
for international donors, however uncomfortable they are for the GoC. It is to
be hoped that donors’ learning from cases like Colombia might lead to
enhanced attention to political analysis in PD application, and also to further
work within the DAC to adapt the PD appropriately to atypical cases – including
atypical kinds of state ‘fragility’ such as we find in Colombia. The strongest
message from this research to donors – albeit an oft-repeated one – is: ignore
political realities at your peril, especially in a complex and conflict-prone
context such as Colombia.
For social actors as well, the undermining or reduction of the LCB process
threatens to marginalise or diminish them and their efforts. This risk is all the
greater given that – at least at the time of our research – social actors were
under-informed about PD, in relation to the importance it was acquiring for
Government and the G24. The social actors who seemed to be most aware of
and involved in PD-related debates – while certainly not apolitical or lacking in
capacity for political analysis and manoeuvring – were not the most radical
actors with the strongest political-opposition identities and the highest profiles.
For international NGOs, Government’s PD adoption – and the way this has
entailed foregrounding the LCB experience in glowing terms – potentially
complicates their advocacy work on Colombia. It could be seen to undermine
key advocacy arguments advanced by the international NGOs: that the Uribe
government lacks a poverty focus, rejects international mechanisms of state
accountability, and spurns democratic dialogue and dissent.
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If Colombian social actors get up to speed on the PD they can make it work for
them and their issues. The Accra Agenda for Action offers an opportunity: with
careful brinkmanship, social actors such as the Alliance can effectively invoke
the AAA’s legitimation of civil society’s involvement in aid and policy dialogue
generally and in the pursuit of PD principles specifically. Their international
NGO partners can help them master the PD and aid debates in general by
sharing knowledge and experience from their own policy units and aid
programmes in other more traditionally aid-dependent regions of the world.
One critical condition for international NGOs working in Colombia to be taken
seriously in this would be for their policy messages on aid to drop the call for
‘more aid’ in favour of a consistent call for ‘better aid’ – but this is in any case a
natural development against a backdrop of OECD governments cutting public
spending and slashing aid budgets. Colombian and international social
organisations well-versed in rights-based approaches to development can even
turn the PD into an opportunity to further discourses of and respect for rights.
The Alliance has already started to go that way, by introducing into the LCB
2009 agenda a workshop on ‘The MDGs from an equity perspective’, which it
used to push an economic, social and cultural rights approach to the MDGs.
The current conjuncture, viewed from this perspective, shows that civil society
advocacy has worked, on some levels at least. That the GoC needed to repair
its international image by joining the PD is largely due to Colombian social
actors’ labours, with support from members of the G24 and from international
NGO partners. The wide reach and depth of aid policy debates today means
that even if the MDGs now take centre-stage as GoC would have them do,
human rights, international humanitarian law, conflict and peace will not
disappear. The GoC needs to recognise, likewise, that with themes of state
fragility, conflict and peace-building ascending the donor agenda the world
over, these themes are not going to quietly wither away from donors’
relationships and priorities in Colombia. Quite the opposite. They will endure or
rise in prominence in Colombian aid policy debates, PD or no PD, and no
longer solely or mainly thanks to the LCB process and the struggles of
Colombian human rights activists and accountability claimants.
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Annex 1 List of interviews
conducted
Government of Colombia
Tatiana García and Teresa Camacho, Directorate of International Cooperation,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Sandra Alzate, Director, and Juan Sebastián Estrada, International Aid Advisor,
Acción Social (Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Aid),
Vice-Presidency of the Republic
Tomás Concha, Vice-Director, Human Rights Programme, Vice-Presidency of
the Republic
Donors (G24)
Luz Angela Bernal, Programme Officer, Swiss Development Cooperation
Torgny Svenungsson, Aid Advisor, Swedish International Development Agency,
Embassy of Sweden
Rodrigo Parot, Colombia Country Representative, Inter-American Development
Bank
Manuel Rivera, European Commission Delegation – Bogotá, European Union
Nancy Hardy, First Secretary, Supervisory Program Officer, USAID; and Luis
Roa, USAID
Diana Muñoz, Development Officer, Embassy of Canada
Oriol Willock, Human Rights/Technical Cooperation, British Embassy
Juan Ignacio Arango, Coordination Analyst, United Nations
Marcela Salazar, Local Aid Official, European Commission Delegation –
Bogota, European Union
Fernando Rey Yébenes, General Deputy General Coordinator of Spanish Aid in
Colombia, Agencia Española de Cooperación International para el Desarrollo
AECID
Colombian social actors
Antonio Madariaga, Executive Director, Viva la Ciudadanía, representative of
civil society organisations in the Alliance
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Ana Cristina Portilla, representative of Colombian Jurors’ Commission
(Comisión Colombiana de Juristas) in the Alliance
Rubén Fernández, Corporación Región, representative of civil society
organisations in ALOP (Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de
Promoción al Desarrollo)
Gloria Flórez, Executive Director, Asociación para la Promoción Social
Alternativa MINGA, representative of civil society organisations in the Alliance
Mario Gómez, Director, Fundación Restrepo Barco
Alejandro Matos, Country Representative, Oxfam Intermón
Gary Burniske, Country Director, Mercy Corps (USA/UK)
Kristina Jannerbo, Country Representative, Diakonía (Sweden)
Johnny Glennie, Representative, Christian Aid (United Kingdom and Ireland)
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